Flood insurance arrangements in the European Union for future flood risk under climate and socioeconomic change by Hudson, Paul et al.
VU Research Portal
Flood insurance arrangements in the European Union for future flood risk under
climate and socioeconomic change




DOI (link to publisher)
10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.101966
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Hudson, P., Botzen, W. J. W., & Aerts, J. C. J. H. (2019). Flood insurance arrangements in the European Union
for future flood risk under climate and socioeconomic change. Global Environmental Change, 58, 1-13.
[101966]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.101966
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 22. May. 2021
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Global Environmental Change
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha
Flood insurance arrangements in the European Union for future flood risk
under climate and socioeconomic change
Paul Hudsona,⁎, W.J. Wouter Botzenb,c,d, Jeroen C.J.H. Aertsb
a Institute of Environmental Sciences and Geography, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany
b Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands
cUtrecht University School of Economics (USE), Utrecht University, Utrecht, the Netherlands
d Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, USA







A B S T R A C T
Flood risk will increase in many areas around the world due to climate change and increase in economic ex-
posure. This implies that adequate flood insurance schemes are needed to adapt to increasing flood risk and to
minimise welfare losses for households in flood-prone areas. Flood insurance markets may need reform to offer
sufficient and affordable financial protection and incentives for risk reduction. Here, we present the results of a
study that aims to evaluate the ability of flood insurance arrangements in Europe to cope with trends in flood
risk, using criteria that encompass common elements of the policy debate on flood insurance reform. We show
that the average risk-based flood insurance premium could double between 2015 and 2055 in the absence of
more risk reduction by households exposed to flooding. We show that part of the expected future increase in
flood risk could be limited by flood insurance mechanisms that better incentivise risk reduction by policyholders,
which lowers vulnerability. The affordability of flood insurance can be improved by introducing the key features
of public-private partnerships (PPPs), which include public reinsurance, limited premium cross-subsidisation
between low- and high-risk households, and incentives for policyholder-level risk reduction. These findings were
evaluated in a comprehensive sensitivity analysis and support ongoing reforms in Europe and abroad that move
towards risk-based premiums and link insurance with risk reduction, strengthen purchase requirements, and
engage in multi-stakeholder partnerships.
1. Introduction
Flooding has been considered the natural hazard with the largest
impact on society (CRED-UNISDR, 2015). Moreover, future flood risk
will increase due to changes in flood hazards (flood frequency and in-
tensity), exposure (values at risk), and vulnerability (the susceptibility
to losses). The increase in flood risk due to socioeconomic development
and climate change (IPCC, 2018) has placed growing pressure on in-
surance markets (Mechler et al., 2014; European Comission, 2017a,b;
Cremades et al., 2018). This has resulted in declining welfare for those
in flood-prone areas, for example, due to rising insurance premiums or
uncertainty over future insurance coverage as risks become perceived
as less insurable. Moreover, the increasing flood risk has initiated dis-
cussions about insurance market reforms (Michel-Kerjan and
Kunreuther, 2011; European Comission, 2013; Surminski et al., 2015).
For instance, in the United States, it is being debated whether flood risk
can be privately insured (Michel-Kerjan et al., 2015; Kousky et al.,
2018) and which insurance mechanisms can provide better incentives
for policyholder risk reduction (Kunreuther, 2015b; Kousky et al.,
2018). Such incentives are important because policyholders can lower
potential flood impacts (Hudson et al., 2016; Surminski et al., 2016;
Aerts et al., 2018), for instance, by floodproofing buildings. Flood-
proofing consists of property-level measures which, for example, limit
the potential damage once water has entered a building (known as wet
floodproofing) or attempt to prevent water from entering a building
(known as dry floodproofing).
Flood insurance reform is also being debated in Europe, where each
country has developed particular insurance arrangements as a result of
different risk profiles and public policy preferences (Surminski, 2017).
One feature of the discussion about flood insurance reforms is the de-
sirability of replacing fixed-rate insurance premiums with risk-based
premiums (European Comission, 2013). Risk-based premiums may, in
theory, incentivise damage mitigation by rewarding those who reduce
risk with premium discounts (Lamond and Penning‐Rowsell, 2014). The
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aggregated effects of individual action could provide a noticeable
contribution to overall risk reduction, in turn lowering pressure on
insurance markets. However, a disadvantage of risk-based premiums is
that they may be unaffordable for low-income households in high-risk
areas (DEFRA, 2011; Hudson et al., 2016; FEMA, 2018; Hudson, 2018).
Debates about flood insurance reforms have also focussed on the de-
sirability of different degrees of government and private sector in-
volvement and whether coverage should be mandated or voluntary.
The main objective of this paper is to conduct a comparative ana-
lysis of a range of flood insurance market structures across Europe in
relation to changing flood risk to identify common patterns of desirable
characteristics of different types of flood insurance arrangements. This
can provide a starting point for future flood insurance market reforms
across Europe. For this investigation, we couple pre-existing models of
insurance sectors, consumer behaviour, and flood risk in a single model
evaluation framework, called the Dynamic Integrated Flood and
Insurance (DIFI) model, so that a holistic assessment can take place.
Such an analysis should account for the risk management objectives of
countries because the development of disaster insurance occurs in re-
sponse to public policy choices based on these objectives (Surminski,
2017). The DIFI model evaluation is conducted from the perspective of
policymakers who wish to promote disaster insurance markets that
manage the trade-offs between important insurance market outcomes.
To account for these trade-offs, we conduct a multi-criteria analysis
(MCA) of the key evaluation criteria, where the weights associated with
each criterion act as a proxy for the risk management objective. Our
research directions are extensions of the previous literature, which has
focussed on qualitative evaluations of flood insurance markets (Michel-
Kerjan and Kunreuther, 2011) or evaluations of a single market struc-
ture (Hudson et al., 2016). Due to limited information on household-
level risk perception and mitigation efforts at the European scale, we
employ a stylised scenario approach in a unified modelling framework,
for which we perform an extensive sensitivity analysis. Moreover, an
established modular model framework can act as a basis for future re-
search as the DIFI model can be updated when new information be-
comes available, such as on flood risk or property-level behaviour. Our
evaluation of stylised flood insurance arrangements allows for drawing
generalisable lessons which are also applicable outside of Europe.
2. Methods
An evaluation of flood insurance market structures suitable for
policymakers requires an analysis of economic efficiency and equity of
different market features. We define efficiency as incentives for risk
reduction that originate from the ability of insurance to send a price
signal of risk (Baur, 2016). Moreover, low premium costs for house-
holds can lead to higher coverage levels, as noted in Lamond and
Penning-Rowsell (2014). Whilst there is no universal definition of
equity (Thaler and Hartmann, 2016), we focus on its distributive as-
pects by recognising that those threatened by flooding should have
equal opportunities to purchase flood insurance and that risk-spreading
mechanisms, like insurance, include principles of solidarity (Johnson
et al., 2007; Thaler and Hartmann, 2016; Sayers et al., 2018; Thaler
et al., 2018). Therefore, equity is taken to mean the affordability of
premiums and the degree of risk sharing amongst households facing
high and low flood risk.
We employ the DIFI model to assess the criteria listed in Table 1 for
two time periods (2015–2035 and 2035–2055) to conduct a holistic
evaluation of the range of different flood insurance market structures
for a country. We design six categories of stylised market structures,
which capture the core market features that influence the evaluation
criteria, to evaluate existing structures in European countries and the
benefits of market reform—for example, the drivers of insurance pur-
chase (e.g., voluntary or mandated) or the differentiation of insurance
premiums according to risk.
Our evaluation criteria are based on the debate surrounding flood
insurance mechanisms as collected through a literature review (see
SI8.1). This assessment highlights the importance of the following de-
sirable characteristics of flood insurance arrangements: 1) the overall
insurance penetration rate, 2) incentivised risk mitigation, 3) the ability
to absorb large losses, 4) the ability to provide quick and certain
compensation, and 5) the affordability and availability of insurance.
These characteristics are further operationalised in our study according
to the criteria in Table 1, which have been derived as follows. Criteria 1
and 2 are the aforementioned benefits of higher penetration rates and
risk mitigation efforts by households. The Solvency II European Union
legislation requires the compliance of European insurers to an annual
insolvency probability of 0.5%. Therefore, insurers are already regu-
lated to be able to absorb a large loss, which implies that characteristic
3 is met and does not need to be included as a separate criterion in our
study. Similarly, characteristic 4 is met as this study focusses on formal
flood insurance arrangements which provide quick and certain com-
pensation. Characteristic 5 is further refined into costs imposed on low-
risk households (criteria 3) and unaffordability of insurance for high-
risk households (criteria 4) to capture the core equity concerns.
These criteria were drawn from literature regarding flood, and
natural hazard, insurance (see SI8.1.1). This was complemented by a
qualitative assessment of responses collected from a stakeholder en-
gagement process (see SI8.1.2). The purpose of the stakeholder en-
gagement process was to get a qualitative check of the MCA criteria and
weighting derived from the literature review. However, whilst the
stakeholder engagement confirmed that the selected criteria were sui-
table, the sample was not fully representative of all stakeholders or
Europe as a whole. Nevertheless, since our MCA approach is based on
the literature review, it does not strongly rely on the implications
arising from the stakeholder consultation.
Our final four criteria in Table 1 closely match the criteria used by
Hochrainer-Stigler and Lorant (2018) for an MCA of disaster risk
management partnerships across Europe. Their selected criteria are
economic efficiency (costs of insurance), risk reduction incentives,
equity (solidarity and decreasing inequalities), and feasibility. Whilst
Hochrainer-Stigler and Lorant (2018) derived these criteria from a
different process, they strongly resemble our selections, which affords
confidence in their suitability. Within our MCA framework, each of the
four evaluation criteria in Table 1 are associated with a specific weight.
Altering the size of the weights changes the relative importance of the
evaluation criteria. As such, different weighting schemes represent
different public policy objectives from national solidarity (a focus on
affordability and market penetration rates) to insurance being a private
matter (a focus on risk signalling). The relative importance attached to
each of these criteria can change the outcomes of the analysis regarding
the optimal market structure.
Table 1
Summary and definition of the evaluation criteria estimated by the DIFI model.
Definition Benefit/Cost
Criterion 1: Insurance penetration rate The average percentage of households with high flood risk that buy sufficient insurance at the national level Benefit
Criterion 2: Incentivised risk reduction The total net present value (NPV) of incentivised risk reduction conducted by households at the national level Benefit
Criterion 3: Cost on low-risk households The NPV of the subsidy of high-risk households paid by low-risk households, aggregated to the national level Cost
Criterion 4: Unaffordability of insurance The NPV of the magnitude of unaffordability, measured as the portion of premiums that cannot be paid from a
poverty-adjusted disposable income at the national level
Cost
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The DIFI modelling framework is presented in Fig. 1 and explained
in detail in the supplementary information (SI) section SI1. The model
consists of several modules: flood risk assessment under climate and
socioeconomic change (SI2), insurance sector (SI3), and consumer be-
haviour (SI4). Based on the flood risk assessment, the DIFI model cal-
culates flood insurance premiums (SI3) using the premium setting rules
developed in Paudel et al. (2015) and Paudel et al. (2013) and simulates
consumer behaviour dependent on the flood insurance market structure
(see SI4). Consumer decisions involve purchasing insurance and in-
vesting in flood damage mitigation measures, which is determined in a
cost-benefit assessment that applies a subjective expected utility fra-
mework. Depending on the insurance market structure, incentives for
risk mitigation resulting from premium discounts are included. The
model was used to estimate the evaluation criteria in Table 1, which
serve as input for the final evaluation framework (SI5). This evaluation
is based on a comparative analysis to provide an indication of the re-
lative benefits of the different insurance market structures, which are
robust to some of the uncertainty in the model regarding the precise
estimated criteria values. The criteria were estimated over two twenty-
year periods: 2015–2035 and 2035–2055. The focus of the model is on
those households at highest risk (i.e., those living in the area that can be
affected by the one in one-hundred-year flood).
2.1. Flood risk modelling (SI2)
An existing coupled hydrological-flood-damage model (LISFLOOD)
Fig. 1. Flow chart of the DIFI model version 1.0 modelling scheme.
Note: Blue circles represent the flood risk model components, red diamonds represent insurer behaviour, red rectangles represent policyholder behaviour, and green
hexagons represent the multi-criteria analysis. The combined flood risk model, insurer, and policyholder behaviour elements form the DIFI model.
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at the European scale estimates the current and future risk of riverine
floods across Europe, as presented in Feyen et al. (2012) and Rojas et al.
(2013).
The combined model estimates the household-level loss [L p( )j t, ]
from a flood with an exceedance probability (occurrence probability) of
p in NUTS 2 region j at time t given a certain level of flood protection
(PSj). L p( )j t, is an increasing function of hazard H p[ ( )j t, ], exposure
(Ej t, ), and vulnerability (Vj t, ), which is shared over households at risk
N( ),j t, as shown in Eq. (1). Eq. (1) estimates the average flood damage
per household from a given flood event. Kron (2005) provides defini-
tions for exposure, vulnerability, and hazard: exposure is the value of
assets that can be flooded, vulnerability is the degree to which assets
are susceptible to being damaged, and hazard is defined as the mag-
nitude of a hydrological event. The underlying flood risk model com-
bines each of the above components using spatially referenced data to
value the damage caused by a flood of a given exceedance probability.
A damage probability curve is fitted based on a power-law function
from several occurrence probabilities. Damage amounts for the fol-
lowing return periods are estimated as: 1/2, 1/5, 1/10, 1/20, 1/50, 1/
100, 1/250, and 1/500. A Monte Carlo simulation using these return
periods produces an estimate of the annual expected flood loss per
household and the variance of losses.
In estimating the annual expected flood loss per household, the
presence of protection standards (i.e., dikes) is accounted for in the
hazard element of the flood risk model. A country that lacks protection
standards would calculate risk over the probability range [0, 1].
Following Jongman et al. (2014), the presence of protection standards
truncates the upper bound from 1 to the flood probability that exceeds
the protection standard (PS )j . For example, a protection standard of 1%
means that only a flood event with an exceedance probability equal to
or smaller than 1% will cause an impact. It is assumed that protection
standards are fixed over time (Winsemius et al., 2016; Alfieri et al.,
2018; Vousdoukas et al., 2018). This implies that government invest-
ments in flood protection infrastructure maintain a constant dike failure
probability when river discharges alter as a result of climate change.
The values of PSj used are taken from Jongman et al. (2014), who
provide an estimate of regional protection standards in Europe.
=L p
f H p E V
N
PS( )
( ( ) , , )
|j t





The output of the coupled hydrological-flood-damage model is
converted into average annual expected losses for households in an area
with a flood probability of at least 1% in the absence of protection
standards. This area is defined as having high flood risk, which is
consistent with Schwarze and Wagner (2007) and FEMA (2016). Low-
risk households are those with a flood occurrence probability below 1%
(in the absence of protection standards). Future flood risk is modelled
by assuming that climate changes follow the SRES A1 scenario. More-
over, future exposed assets and population are estimated by rescaling
flood impacts through the ratio of the future and baseline real GDP or
population according to the ensemble mean of the various shared so-
cioeconomic pathway (SSP) scenarios (Rojas et al., 2013). Therefore, all
estimated insurance premiums are in real terms.
The underlying hydrological-flood-damage model estimates the
current and future risk of riverine floods across Europe at a
100m×100m (gridded) scale (Feyen et al., 2012; Rojas et al., 2013).
However, the use of very detailed data would in practise entail high
transaction costs for insurance companies as such information is not
freely accessible (Osberghaus, 2015), which means that calculating
premiums on this level may be infeasible (Porrini and Schwarze, 2014).
Therefore, the estimated risk is aggregated to the NUTS 2 level, which is
considered a suitable regional classification. Second, the obligation to
buy insurance, along with the geographical size of the pool in which
many risks are spread, eliminates concerns about adverse selection
that may arise when premiums are set on an individual basis
(see Section 2.2).
Details of the flood risk modelling approach are provided in SI2.
2.2. Insurance sector (SI3)
We assume that each country under investigation has an insurance
market that is willing to provide, and capable of providing, flood in-
surance to consumers as long as the consumer pays the offered pre-
mium. Moreover, we assume that the insurance policies offered provide
sufficient coverage to avoid underinsurance. Due to this assumption,
the DIFI model only captures underinsurance through lower penetra-
tion rates.
The insurance sector module uses the objective risk outcomes of the
flood risk model to set insurance premiums (SI3.1), given the premium
loading factors that depend on the market structure in which they op-
erate (SI3.2). The primary insurance market (i.e., bought by house-
holds) is assumed to be highly competitive, whilst the reinsurance
market (i.e., insurance bought by insurers) is assumed to be less so.
Insurers will offer insurance premium discounts if a household employs
risk mitigation measures. In all modelled insurance market structures,
the insurance premium is calculated at the start of the year and is set at
that value until the next year before considering household-level miti-
gation efforts. Only households that employ mitigation measures can
receive premium discounts in line with the reduced risk (SI3.3).
We developed six flood insurance market structures (M1–M6),
Table 2, based on information collected about European market struc-
tures (SI8) that reflect a range of market features. These are stylised
market structures and, as such, capture the average performances and
characteristics of a market structure. We focus on the market features
that are important for generating the evaluation criteria. Therefore,
there may be deviation between the stylised assumptions and what
occurs in practise. However, a large-scale application, such as the DIFI
model, inevitably requires that some details of current existing in-
surance market structures cannot be represented in the model. Never-
theless, this approach is in line with our aim to arrive at insights into
general patterns across the European Union about the performance of
flood insurance market structures in light of climate change and de-
sirable reforms. Moreover, focussing the analysis on country-specific
examples would not enable the study of potential counterfactual mar-
kets (e.g., France moving from a public solidarity-based market to a
more private-sector-orientated market), whilst this is feasible with our
stylised market structures.
The main structure of insurance premiums (across market struc-
tures) is based on Hudson et al. (2016); Paudel et al. (2013), and Paudel
et al. (2015). Here, the premium which insurers charge households
differs across market structures and takes the form displayed in Eq. (2),
where: i j t s, , , represents the premium charged to household i in NUTS 2
region j at time t under market structure s, with s taking the value 1 for
the solidarity market structure, 2 for the PPP market, 3 for the volun-
tary market structure, 4 for the semi-voluntary structure, and 5 and 6
are the semi, voluntary, and full PPP markets, respectively; ERDRR is the
discount that insurers will provide depending on the level of household
risk reduction, which entails either one or both of dry and wet flood-
proofing, as described in section SI3.2; and ¯j t s, , is the baseline average
risk per household within a particular market structure for a given
NUTS 2 region.
= ER(1 ) ¯i j t s DRR j t s, , , , , (2)
The precise value of ¯j t s, , differs across market structures, as shown
in SI3. However, the key difference between market structures is how
strongly ¯j t s, , is connected to the risk that a household may face. A
market with no connection to risk will have the lowest premiums for
high-risk households, whilst one with a strong connection to risk is
likely to have the highest premiums for these households. However,
these premiums may be limited if households do implement risk-re-
ducing measures.
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The proposed market structures are:
M1—solidarity public structure: All households must buy an in-
surance policy at a fixed price, regardless of their objective flood risk
and personal preferences (e.g., an automatic extension of insurance
policies). The premium is determined by equally sharing risks across all
households (in a nation) regardless of their individual risk (SI3.1.1).
M2—The semi-voluntary private market is similar to the voluntary
private market (SI3.1.3) except that mortgage, or rental, conditions
have a requirement or tradition of comprehensive insurance coverage.
However, coverage is not complete because those without mortgages
are not compelled to insure. Although mortgaged buildings are almost
universally insured, contents within a building are less often insured
(Surminski and Eldridge, 2015), especially for low-income households
(O’Neill and O’Neill, 2012; FEMA, 2018).
M3—voluntary private market: Households have the free choice of
whether to buy flood insurance at risk-based premiums. Policyholders
pay a premium in proportion to their annual expected loss, plus a
surcharge covering insurer cost, profit, and risk aversion (SI3.1.3).
M4—Semi-voluntary PPP is similar to the semi-voluntary private
market except that it is supported by a PPP. This is assumed to be a not-
for-profit public reinsurer who charges a reinsurance premium for
coverage. Introducing a public non-profit and risk-neutral reinsurer for
a portion of risk will limit insurance premiums for households.
M5—Voluntary PPP has no purchase requirements and is similar to
the voluntary private market except that it is supported by a not-for-
profit public reinsurer.
M6—The PPP market is a compromise between M1 and M5. It
connects insurance coverage with mortgage (or rental) conditions, it
contains a public reinsurer (SI3.1.2), and premiums are risk based up to
a threshold level at which the premium is capped (with possible sur-
charges to cover administrative costs). To maintain solvency, this
shortfall is accounted for by placing a surcharge on the lower-risk
households. This outcome can also be achieved by raising levies, similar
to Flood Re. This organisation uses levies to generate a sufficient capital
reserve that can be used to provide indemnity payments when the ac-
cessible financial resources prove insufficient.
Both private and public reinsurers charge a premium to primary
insurers for the coverage they provide. However, reinsurers apply a
premium surcharge due to their risk aversion (Paudel et al., 2015),
whilst, due to the greater risk-spreading potential (e.g., taxation),
public reinsurers are risk neutral and do not require a surcharge.
However, providing public sector reinsurance facilities could be pro-
blematic as levels of risk aversion will vary amongst governments and
are dependent on financial circumstances. Refocusing the European
Union Solidarity Fund can be an alternative if it is reformed to act as a
reinsurer or a co-insurance-style pool across the European Union. This
would provide a great deal of geographical diversification, and such a
reorientation is in line with a proposal directed towards the European
Union Solidarity Fund in Hochrainer et al. (2010).
In each of the market structures above, the first role of the gov-
ernment is investing in risk-reduction infrastructure to maintain pro-
tection standards (see Section 2.1). These flood protection standards
keep flood probabilities constant under changing climate conditions,
which is important for creating an environment for insurance markets
to operate and maintain insurability of flood risk (Surminski and
Thieken, 2017; Insurance Europe, 2018c; The Geneva Association,
2018).
The second role of the government occurs in M4 to M6, which are
extensions of M1 to M3, in which the government acts as a reinsurer for
the extreme element of flood risk that is expensive to reinsure privately
(Paudel et al., 2015). Even though private-sector reinsurance is avail-
able, such coverage is more expensive compared to the publicly pro-
vided reinsurance. In all market structures, the government does not
directly subsidise premiums.
A country is allocated to a stylised market based on how closely a
market meets the following features: purchase requirements and the
connection between premiums and risk. These points of comparison are
the main aspects of the market that generate the four aforementioned
evaluation criteria. This is because purchase requirements drive in-
surance penetration rates (Golnaraghi et al., 2017; Schanz, 2018),
which can be influenced by legal obligations or by product design
(Insurance Europe, 2018a) and the demand for non-insurance products
(e.g., mortgages for which coverage is required). The link between
premiums and risk can create trade-offs between affordability and the
ability to incentivise risk reduction (Hudson et al., 2016). Finally, the
combination of these two features determines the cross subsidy re-
quired between high- and low-risk policyholders.
Once an initial allocation has been made, the choice is refined based
on the degree of government support available for the insurance in-
dustry and for households affected by flooding. For instance, public
reinsurance (as is possible under M1) helps to keep premiums low by
replacing potentially high private (risk-averse) reinsurance premiums
with a lower public (risk-neutral) reinsurance premium. Also, the pre-
sence of government compensation can create a charity hazard which
lowers the demand for insurance as the cost of not being insured is
lower (Raschky and Weck-Hannemann, 2007). Both of these features
are important for determining voluntary demand. Higher premiums can
reduce the demand for insurance as the perceived benefits of insurance
are smaller or the premium becomes unaffordable.
An assumption following from our assessment of fluvial flood risk is
that flood insurance is treated as a stand-alone insurance product.
However, flood insurance is often bundled with other natural hazard
risks in countries with high penetration rates. In practise, such bundling
often implies having semi-voluntary purchase requirements since flood
coverage is commonly bundled with other risks like fire, for which it is
compulsory to have coverage to meet mortgage requirements (see
European Comission, 2017a, for example). Therefore, in our solidarity,
semi-voluntary, and PPP markets, the insurance product could be
considered part of a wider bundle of natural hazard risks. Bundling
reduces the need for a conscious decision to buy a specific type of in-
surance. This is accounted for in our consumer behaviour model since,
in semi-voluntary markets, flood insurance demand is not modelled as a
conscious choice in an expected utility maximisation decision rule but
instead as a fixed percentage that is calibrated based on observed pe-
netration rates in these markets. Bundling could reduce the transpar-
ency of the insurance premium because it is based on a combination of
risks, which may lower incentives for the policyholder to take measures
to limit flood risk. This could be limited by better documentation of the
risk elements that make up the premium and by reinforcing the link
with property-level risk management, for example, by offering dis-
counts to policyholders who take measures that limit their risk.
2.3. Household behaviour (SI4)
Details of the household behaviour modelling approach are pro-
vided in SI4 and are summarised here. Household behaviour consists of
two decisions: to buy insurance (SI4.1) and to employ risk-mitigation
measures (SI4.2).
A household makes an initial decision to undertake a risk mitigation
measure based on the household’s subjective level of flood risk and, as
such, the perceived benefits of mitigation, which can be over- or un-
derestimated. Next, the household makes a decision to buy insurance
(M2 and M4) or is compelled to do so (the remaining market struc-
tures). Unless households are mandated to buy insurance, they will only
buy insurance if the subjective expected utility of being insured is larger
than the expected utility of not being insured and if the premium is
affordable (SI4.1). The subjective expected utility framework is a model
of individual decision making under risk (Savage, 1954). Households’
risk perceptions are expected to deviate from objective risk in terms of
flood occurrence probabilities and the potential damage suffered.
The subjective risk perceptions are calibrated based on previous
studies, as noted in SI4.1–SI4.2. However, there is limited information
P. Hudson, et al. Global Environmental Change 58 (2019) 101966
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available on the risk perceptions or mitigation behaviour of individuals
across Europe. Therefore, we undertake a scenario approach in which
we calibrate separate risk-perception distributions for simulating flood
insurance demand and decisions to employ risk-reduction measures in
the absence of insurance-based incentives. Perceptions of flood prob-
ability are based on empirical studies (Botzen et al., 2009, 2015), and
perceptions of flood damage follow a generalised Pareto distribution,
both of which are calibrated to match regional insurance demand in
Germany (GDV, 2013). Germany was selected for this since it provides
the most detailed information within Europe about voluntary flood
insurance purchases. The demand for household-level risk-reduction
measures is based on a subjective cost-benefit analysis in which the
benefits relate to the perceived reduction of flood risk by implementing
a risk-reduction measure. This variable accounts for the possible mis-
perceptions of the flood probability, the expected flood loss, and the
potential effectiveness of the risk-reduction measure, and its distribu-
tion has been calibrated to match the observed usage of dry and wet
floodproofing measures as reported in the following three studies:
Kreibich et al. (2005), Bubeck et al. (2012), and Poussin et al. (2013). In
the absence of detailed data at the European level, we create three risk
perception scenarios. We focus on the average outcomes across these
three risk perception scenarios in a similar way to how many flood risk
assessment studies use ensemble climate model outcomes. However,
this has the implication that the precise values of household behaviour
resulting from these scenarios should be treated with caution. Never-
theless, the relative outcomes across the various scenarios and market
structures may be less sensitive to uncertainty in this aspect of the
model because each market is exposed to the same distributions of
subjective risk perceptions.
A household with insurance coverage will be exposed to a potential
premium discount if the household employs mitigation measures. This
may promote a household to employ a mitigation measure if it did not
do so initially. The more strongly premiums are risk based, the stronger
this incentive will be (e.g., in the solidarity public structure, incentives
are negligible). It should be noted that in some market structures and
areas, the flood insurance premium, and hence the premium discount
for taking risk-mitigation measures, is too low to act as an incentive to
change policyholder behaviour. This can occur in areas with a low flood
risk where employing flood risk-mitigation measures is not cost-effec-
tive. Moreover, this can happen in countries with a high degree of cross-
subsidisation of premiums, which occurs in the solidarity market
structure (M1). Both of these aspects are captured by our model, and
indeed we find that the incentivised risk reduction through insurance is
low in these market structures and in areas facing lower risk.
Moreover, there is an indirect interaction between household-level
risk-reduction measures and the flood protection standards maintained
by the government because the latter influence flood insurance pre-
miums and the expected value of avoided flood damage by flood-
proofing measures. For instance, flood risk is low in areas with high
flood protection standards, which results in lower premiums and lower
benefits for household risk reduction in terms of either avoided flood
damage or premium discounts compared to areas with low flood pro-
tection standards.
The household behaviour modelling approach is based on Hudson
et al. (2016) and now includes budget constraints (SI4). The budget
constraint implies that a household will only buy insurance if it is af-
fordable to do so based on its income at the time of the decision. In-
cluding the budget constraint captures the tendency of higher-income
households to be insured more often (Raschky et al., 2013). Insurance is
deemed unaffordable when the premium to be paid is larger than the
household’s disposable income above the poverty line (Hudson et al.,
2016; Zhao et al., 2016; FEMA, 2018). The total magnitude of insurance
unaffordability is estimated as the sum of the unaffordable portion of
insurance premiums (SI4.1). A similar budget constraint also applies to
the employment of risk-reduction measures, where the measure is only
taken if it is affordable at the time of purchase given any expenditure on
insurance. The reason is that whilst a measure may be cost-effective in
the long run, a household is unlikely to employ such a measure when it
is currently unaffordable (SI4.2). This way, our model accounts for
different capabilities between high- and low-income households to take
flood risk adaptation measures. An implication is that insurance is only
able to incentivise risk reduction if both the premium and the measure
are affordable.
2.4. Overall market evaluation (SI5)
The MCA evaluation framework is based on the key evaluation
criteria for the periods 2015–2035 and 2035–2055, as described in SI5.
In an MCA framework, each of the key evaluation criteria can be as-
sociated with different weights as a measurement of the relative im-
portance (trade-offs) that policymakers attach to one criterion as
compared to the others.
The MCA method allows for identifying the relative benefits of the
market structures and for finding the optimal market structures through
a holistic comparative study of the evaluation criteria. The ensemble
mean (across behaviour scenarios) of four criteria is aggregated from
the NUTS 2 to the national level and standardised into a score for the
structure within a country. This is done by creating a weighted sum
across the four criteria for each market structure within a country.
In the MCA, the evaluation criteria are standardised and aggregated
following Eq. (3). S c s1 , is the score for market structure s in country c for
the first period (or the second if S c s2 , ). The values for each indicator
(Ac s,1 ) are standardised since this allows the variables to have a common
metric and to be weighted according to perceived importance. The
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The possible choices for { }mn can alter the overall attractiveness of
the various market structures for each country. To account for the un-
certainty in setting the weights, we use a range of weights to compare
patterns of desirable market structures across different risk-manage-
ment objectives. In particular, the following multiple sets of weights are
used: (a) equal weights, where =1/4; (b) one element is weighted at
= 2/5 and the remaining two elements at = 1/5 (with an alter-
nating element with the double weight); and (c) two elements are
weighted at = 3/10 and the remaining elements at = 1/5 (with
alternating elements with the higher weight). There are eleven unique
combinations of weights which reflect systematic differences in the
importance of outcomes. These weights have been set by the authors to
model outcomes under a range of potential public policy objectives
described in SI8. The evaluation criteria and weights are applied
equally to all the countries studied. Our approach is similar to the MCA
employed in Unterberger et al. (2019) to model objectives for public-
sector flood risk management in Austria. Our MCA identifies the market
structure that, on average, scored the highest across the eleven sets of
risk-management objectives (as proxy measured by the different
weighting schemes) to indicate the optimal market. This approach as-
sumes that one set of risk-management objectives is not treated as more
important than another, the implications of which are discussed in
section
2.5. Sensitivity analysis (SI6)
An extensive sensitivity analysis was conducted, the results of which
are presented in SI6, to find if the results are overall robust to changes
in model structure or parameter values. In particular, the assumptions
tested in the sensitivity analysis were: uncertainty in risk and insurance
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premium estimates (SI6.1), different flood risk scenarios (SI6.2), alter-
nate construction of the insurance premium discount (SI6.3), using a
single national pool of high-risk households rather than regional dif-
ferentiation (SI6.4), alternative assumptions about the costs and effec-
tiveness of risk-reduction measures (SI6.5), alternative assumptions on
the utility function determining flood insurance demand (SI6.6), and a
different MCA ranking scheme (SI6.7).
3. Results
3.1. Flood insurance reform pathways
To our knowledge, this is the first large-scale study that integrates
flood risk assessment, the insurance sector, and consumer behaviour in
one modelling approach to assess insurance market structures against
increasing flood risk. The DIFI model estimates that, on average, risk-
based insurance premiums could double for the countries investigated
between 2015 and 2055 if no flood insurance market reforms are un-
dertaken. Hence, increasing flood risk will place pressures on stake-
holders, such as insurers, to meet international agreements on disaster
risk reduction, such as the Hyogo (Wilby and Keenan, 2012) and Sendai
frameworks (UNISDR, 2015) and the Paris Agreement (UNFCC, 2018).
Insurance could play an important role in providing both financial
protection against flood losses and incentives for risk reduction. Flood
insurance arrangements require reform to cope with increasing risk,
and we demonstrate that household-level risk-reduction measures can
be incentivised through a stronger link between risk reduction and the
premiums charged. This finding highlights the importance of devel-
oping partnerships between the insurance sector and other flood risk
management stakeholders to overcome the barriers to establishing an
active link between premiums and risk reduction, for example, using
certification schemes of floodproofing practises (Golnaraghi et al.,
2017).
More precisely, the DIFI model output produces an average house-
hold insurance premium that is lowest in the solidarity public structure
(€5–€125 per year in 2015) and highest in the private voluntary mar-
kets (€30–€2000 per year in 2015). These differences in premiums
translate into different rates of unaffordability due to the differing de-
grees of cross-subsidisation between high- and low-risk households. For
instance, the voluntary private insurance premiums are unaffordable
for about 21% of the regional population in high-risk areas (on
average), whilst this is only 16% in the PPP market (see SI7.1).
However, the cost for low-risk households is lowest when premiums are
based on risk with limited cross-subsidisation.
The risk mitigation incentives from insurance are not found to be
effective in the solidarity public structure since the potential premium
discount is too low (an average of €14 per year in 2055); see SI7.2. The
voluntary market structures offer stronger incentives of, on average,
€500 per year. However, fewer households are exposed to this incentive
due to the lower market penetration rate of flood insurance. This is
because the premium is unaffordable for many households, or it is
perceived as being too high compared with the benefits of insuring. The
PPP markets are found to be more successful in incentivising dry
floodproofing than wet floodproofing measures due to their higher in-
vestment costs. Overall, insurance is more affordable in PPP markets,
which also have a higher penetration rate that enables more risk re-
duction through the insurance incentives.
Fig. 2A and B show how market structures would evolve from the
current situation (2015) towards optimal structures for the period
2035–2055. During the 2015 to 2035 period, most countries are ad-
vised to move towards the semi-voluntary market (PPP) which entails
reforms introducing public reinsurance and strengthening (indirect)
purchase requirements. For the 2035 to 2055 period, the majority of
countries will benefit from continued reform towards a full PPP market
structure. For about a third of the countries, we estimate a reform
pathway where the market structure evolves over time (see SI7.1).
This highlights that there may not be a single optimal market
structure but a changing bundle of desirable features. Several studies
have also argued that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for insurance
markets (Surminski et al., 2016; Hochrainer-Stigler and Lorant, 2018;
Raadgever et al., 2018). An example is the public response to the EC
green paper on disaster insurance, which showed that many of the re-
spondents were against the harmonisation of insurance regulations
across the European Union (Surminski et al., 2015). Our study’s focus,
however, is on deriving general characteristics to guide reforms, and
there are still many options for fine-tuning the exact method of im-
plementation in a way that is in line with different preferences of local
stakeholders. Moreover, there is not a single optimal market structure
across periods and countries. Instead, we find that a process of con-
tinued reform over time is advisable for most of Europe: from the
current market structure to the semi-voluntary PPP market and then
towards the features of the PPP market.
Regardless of the absence of a single optimal market structure, al-
tering market structures as suggested can improve the welfare of those
living in flood-prone areas. This is because of the greater certainty in
receiving suitable compensation after a flood or a greater sense of se-
curity due to being better prepared before a flood (See SI7.3). For in-
stance, increased insurance coverage improves the welfare of a risk-
averse household by exchanging an uncertain, and potentially cata-
strophic, loss from a flood for a certain, smaller payment in the form of
an insurance premium. A higher market penetration of flood insurance
can, therefore, be seen as welfare enhancing because of improved fi-
nancial coverage against flood damage.
Moreover, from the policymaker perspective, uninsured flood im-
pacts are undesirable as they are a driver of long-run negative macro-
economic impacts (Von Peter et al., 2012). Underinsurance is also a
well-known issue in natural hazard insurance markets (The Geneva
Association, 2018). For example, Austria has a penetration rate of
nearly 85%, but less than 10% of the value exposed to flooding is in-
sured (Insurance Europe, 2018b). In practise, coverage levels can vary
amongst countries, which implies that flood insurance reforms should
not only focus on obtaining a high market penetration but should also
consider achieving sufficient coverage per policy. A closer collaboration
of stakeholders in a PPP market can help to develop long-run me-
chanisms for limiting risks, like incentivising policyholder risk reduc-
tion, and for increasing coverage to limit the issue of underinsurance
(Schanz, 2018; The Geneva Association, 2018).
The following findings are important for improving welfare: limited
premium cross-subsidisation between high- and low-risk households,
involvement of the government (or a transnational body) as reinsurer,
incentives for policyholders to implement floodproofing measures to
homes, purchase requirements such as mandating flood coverage, or
connecting flood insurance coverage to mortgages or other more com-
monly acquired insurance policies such as fire. Such purchase re-
quirements create a pool in which risks are shared between high- and
low-risk households, and they also prevent adverse selection. The PPP
market imposes lower costs on low-risk households than would occur
under a solidarity market structure due to less premium cross-sub-
sidisation between high- and low-risk households (see SI7.2). The PPP
market manages to provide an acceptable trade-off between the un-
affordability of risk-based premiums and the ability of such premiums
to incentivise policyholders to employ risk-mitigation measures.
3.2. Optimal market structures
As noted, the semi-voluntary PPP (M4) and PPP (M6) markets most
often score highest in the MCA. In particular, their stylised market
features lead to higher average MCA scores, as compared to the vo-
luntary or solidarity market structures. This means that these PPP
markets have stylised features that best manage the trade-offs amongst
the criteria for a given level of risk within a region.
Although premiums are more often unaffordable and the
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penetration rates are slightly lower in the semi-voluntary PPP and PPP
markets, these two markets score systematically better than the soli-
darity public structure (M1) because they perform significantly better
in incentivising risk reduction by policyholders. Moreover, this addi-
tional incentivised risk reduction lowers the premium burden on
households in lower-risk areas. Even though the final MCA score is
determined by each element, the main driver of the performance of the
semi-voluntary PPP and PPP markets is the increase in risk reduction,
which outweighs the negative impacts of lower penetration rates and
higher unaffordability. The main advantage of the semi-voluntary PPP
and PPP market structures compared with the semi-voluntary market
structure (M2) is that the two PPP structures have lower premiums and,
hence, fewer problems with unaffordability of premiums.
Moreover, these two markets also perform better than the voluntary
private (M3) or PPP (M5) market structures due to the higher pene-
tration rate as a result of the indirect and direct purchase requirements.
This has the effect that the risk-based premiums are able to incentivise
additional risk reduction by many policyholders. The penetration rates
under the voluntary markets are significantly lower, which implies few
policyholders receive additional incentives to reduce risk through pre-
mium discounts. In the areas where the PPP market is preferred to the
semi-voluntary PPP, the fully risk-based premiums in the latter market
structure would increase premium unaffordability much more rapidly
than they helped to promote additional risk reduction. The movement
towards the PPP markets in this case indicates that slightly weakening
the link between premiums and risk can reduce the burden of un-
affordability whilst still promoting a sufficient degree of risk reduction.
This combined effect results in an overall higher MCA score. The re-
gions where the semi-voluntary PPP is preferred to the PPP have
slightly lower risk overall, which means that a stronger link between
risk and premiums is required to incentivise sufficient additional risk
reduction.
Fig. 2. Current flood insurance market structures (panel A) and market structure reforms suggested by the DIFI model for the period 2035–2055 (panel B).
Fig. 3. Consequences of incentivised risk reduction (panel A) and unaffordability (panel B) of the insurance market reforms suggested by the DIFI model results for
the year 2055, two elements of household welfare.
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3.3. Implication of proposed insurance reforms for risk mitigation and
affordability of insurance
Fig. 3 shows that moving towards the optimal stylised structures
with varying degrees of PPPs results in an improvement in the amount
of risk mitigation undertaken by households across most areas (Fig. 3A)
when premiums are (partly) risk based. The decision to floodproof
properties under the existing market structures lowers residential risk
on average by ∼17% from 2015 to 2055. The optimal insurance market
structure increases this value to between 20 and 26% due to stronger
risk-mitigation incentives. Though these values are approximate, the
key message is that strengthening insurance purchase requirements and
policyholder risk mitigation can help to lower risk if the unaffordability
concerns are alleviated.
However, for the currently employed solidarity market structures,
the reform towards increased mitigation incentives comes at the ex-
pense of insurance affordability for high-risk households whilst redu-
cing the costs placed on low-risk households (Fig. 3B). In contrast, for
private insurance markets, the unaffordability of insurance outweighs
the potential mitigation incentive of the insurance premiums. This
implies that reform towards PPP is desirable. Unaffordability remains a
concern even in the solidarity market structure, where the link between
insurance and risk is weakest. This suggests that overcoming problems
with unaffordability may require the use of public policies such as in-
surance vouchers for low-income households in high-risk areas
(Kunreuther, 2008). An insurance voucher is provided by the govern-
ment to low-income households for the proportion of the insurance
premium deemed to be unaffordable. The vouchers are issued on a
temporary basis to smooth the transition to new market structures.
Whilst vouchers can ease the cost that high premiums place on low-
income households, the vouchers should remain temporary to prevent
an implicit subsidy for development in flood-prone areas (Kousky and
Kunreuther, 2014).
Another way to improve affordability is to increase the sharing of
losses over many policyholders through the introduction of purchase
requirements. This policy reform expands the risk pool of insured
households, which lowers premiums. Moreover, purchase requirements
limit the threat of asymmetric information to cause market failures
through adverse selection.
However, the introduction of purchase requirements, like in the PPP
market, may also be politically difficult because it can be seen to limit
consumer freedom. This issue is substantiated by discussions regarding
insurance reforms in the Netherlands (Botzen, 2013) and Germany
(Schwarze and Wagner, 2007). Additionally, conflicts with state aid
regulations can arise. This can be seen from the United Kingdom’s in-
troduction of Flood Re, which would be partially funded by an in-
dustrywide levy. This planned reform received criticism as it would
confer an economic advantage to the risk pool over its competitors,
which conflicts with the European Union’s state aid regulations
(European Commission, 2015). Nevertheless, this was decided not to be
the case, although it still acted as an additional hurdle.
The use of public reinsurance can also limit insurance premiums
and, thereby, partly overcome problems with coverage unaffordability.
Our evaluation over time shows that this is especially attractive when
flood risks increase. Risk-averse insurers increase their premiums when
low-probability/high-impact risks increase, especially when these risks
are uncertain (Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther, 2011), as is the case with
flood risk in a changing climate (IPCC, 2012). It may be argued that
governments can more cheaply reinsure extreme losses (Cardenas et al.,
2007) because European governments are, for the most part, risk neu-
tral. Moreover, we find that a public reinsurance facility does not in-
terfere too strongly with the underlying risk signal and incentives for
risk reduction. This is the case because primary insurers pay for the
government support they receive though risk-based reinsurance pre-
miums, and this reinsurance premium is, in the end, reflected in the
premium that households pay. Another advantage of this payment
structure is that the government (and thereby taxpayers overall) re-
ceives a fair share of compensation for provided reinsurance. However,
risk-based premiums imply that high premiums can occur in areas with
a high flood risk when premiums are risk based and people do not
mitigate risk, which implies that these premiums could not be afford-
able or economically viable. This can be overcome in the PPP market
structure which places a cap on premiums.
3.4. Sensitivity analysis
The results of the sensitivity analysis show that the overall pattern
of our main findings is in line with the main assumptions of the model
(SI6). The results consistently confirm the desirability of the features
common to the semi-voluntary PPP and PPP market structures. The link
between premiums and risk reduction in these structures was found to
be very important. When this link was removed, the optimal market
structure became the solidarity market structure in all cases. This shows
that strengthening the link between insurance and risk reduction is
important for the continued use of private insurance in the future, when
flood risk increases due to climate change. Moreover, the stronger the
projected increase in flood risk, the more often the PPP market struc-
ture was found to be optimal (SI7.1), indicating the importance of in-
creasing the role of PPPs, both for sharing flood risk and developing
institutional frameworks for promoting risk reduction.
The current version of the DIFI model can be updated as more lo-
calised or updated information becomes available. Moreover, by com-
paring the patterns of relative scores rather than specific values, the
final recommendations are more robust. One such finding is that
strengthening the link between risk-based insurance and risk mitigation
is important for keeping premium costs low.
4. Discussion
4.1. Policy implications
Our findings have relevance to policies in specific countries. For
instance, there is some similarity between the PPP market and the
United Kingdom’s recently introduced Flood Re. Both are based on the
mandated purchase of insurance through mortgage conditions with an
explicit subsidy for high-risk households. The latter is implemented in
Flood Re by charging a supplement on the premiums of low-risk
households of approximately £10.50 on average per year, which is close
to the estimated cost of €18 (£15) per household per year imposed on
low-risk households by the DIFI model. However, we find that the
current structure of Flood Re is not optimal for the United Kingdom
since incentives for risk reduction are absent. This supports previous
research on the matter (Surminski, 2017). The experience with Flood
Re also shows that the political motivation to provide public re-
insurance coverage can be limited in practise since Flood Re has pur-
chased private-reinsurance-sector coverage.
The solidarity-based market structures of Belgium, France, and
Spain are also in need of reform. The reason is that their current market
structures may not be suitable for coping with future increases in flood
risk due to insufficient incentives for risk reduction. The solidarity
principle concerning flood insurance in these countries may be better
served by stimulating risk reduction through risk-based premiums
whilst addressing equity concerns using additional public policies (e.g.,
means-tested insurance vouchers or tax credits). The remaining coun-
tries with a voluntary purchase requirement (e.g., Germany) should
consider promoting or strengthening purchase requirements as, other-
wise, the penetration rate remains low, preventing many of the benefits
of insurance as a risk-management tool from being realised. For in-
stance, in Hungary, the insurance penetration rate has been increased
by making flood insurance coverage a prerequisite to obtain a mortgage
(European Comission, 2017a).
Our main policy recommendations may also be applicable outside of
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Europe. For instance, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in
the United States has undergone many potential reforms, such as the
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, the Homeowners
Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, and the Flood Insurance
Market Parity and Modernization Act of 2016. These acts are aimed at
improving the financial sustainability of the NFIP. Moreover, these re-
forms aim to improve the actuarial soundness of the program by
moving towards risk-based premiums whilst strengthening purchase
requirements to overcome the observed low penetration rate outside
high-risk areas and improving incentives for risk reduction. Michel-
Kerjan and Kunreuther (2011) propose a set of reforms for the NFIP
similar to those we find favourable for most European countries based
on the DIFI model analysis. However, in both cases, these are high-level
features of a market structure. Therefore, their implementation will
require suitable localisation for them to be politically acceptable and
practicable.
Even though we acknowledge that community- and national-level
risk-reduction efforts are important for adapting to changing flood risk
under climate change, our model mainly focusses on household-level
risk reduction and how this can be steered with premium discounts.
This is because the incentives provided by premium discounts are
commonly discussed advantages of moving towards risk-reflective
premiums in the context of flood insurance market reforms around the
world, e.g., Flood Re (2018), Lamond et al. (2018), Thieken (2018),
European Comission (2017b), and Kunreuther (2017). Moreover, our
focus is consistent with a movement towards integrated flood risk
management in which residents of flood-prone areas are expected to
play a role in limiting flood damage (Bubeck et al., 2016). Our mod-
elling framework shows that human behaviour is an important factor
when assessing flood risk, which is in line with recent calls for in-
tegrating human behaviour into risk assessments (Aerts et al., 2018).
Although we find that exposure growth is a factor that causes flood risk
to rise, the floodproofing of properties by households can limit this
increase in risk. Efforts to reduce risk are stronger when they are ac-
tively incentivised through insurance. For this reason, we study the
potential benefits of increasing the connection between risk mitigation
and insurance.
However, there is often a concern that, in practise, links between
insurance and policyholder-level risk mitigation are insufficient
(Surminski et al., 2015). This is commonly argued to be caused by
transaction costs involved in insurers monitoring policyholders on a
large scale and adjusting premiums accordingly (Hudson et al., 2016).
However, this barrier could be overcome if insurers collaborate with
other organisations, for example, those that certify the floodproofing of
buildings (similar to the home elevation certificates used in the United
States), which emphasises the need for closer partnerships (Kunreuther,
2015a). These PPPs are also highly relevant for increasing other aspects
of societal resilience. Examples are information sharing about risk and
risk-reduction measures, awareness-raising campaigns, offering in-
centives for risk reduction through terms and policy conditions, setting
standards for insurability, and building codes. These are areas in which
collaboration between insurance and public-sector stakeholders can not
only influence risk reduction behaviour but also risk-generating beha-
viour, for example, by limiting exposure growth through building codes
and zoning policies. Our proposed PPP flood insurance market struc-
tures can provide a platform for enabling such integrated flood risk
management approaches.
4.2. Model limitations
Although the DIFI model framework enables the evaluation of flood
insurance markets across Europe, there are several limitations re-
garding the interpretation of the results. However, addressing these
issues can provide directions for future research.
One limitation is that the modelled insurance market structures are
stylised representations of a more complex reality as these do not reflect
the individual nuances of the insurance market in each country. The
current DIFI model framework limits the complexity of insurance
markets by focussing on the market features that have a large influence
on the modelled evaluation criteria, such as purchase requirements, the
connection of premiums with risk, and the availability of public re-
insurance. A challenge is that implementing a higher degree of com-
plexity requires that data on these additional details should be available
at the European scale, which is often not the case or is potentially
outdated (European Comission, 2013, 2017a, 2017b). For example,
insurance coverage levels are difficult to collect and determine due to
the unavailability of standardised measures of flood insurance products
and their coverage across the European Union (European Comission,
2017b). This can be an important practical limitation because pene-
tration rates in a country could be high, but the total coverage offered
by flood insurance can be low, as is the case in Austria (see Insurance
Europe (2018b)). However, we attempt to limit the uncertainty from
the stylised market structures by mainly looking at the relative benefits
of the market structures and the lessons we can learn for 2035–2055
from the overall patterns of desirable reforms we observe. This choice
means that the overall implications are less dependent on the original
allocation of a country to a stylised market structure.
Similar data limitations apply to individual risk perceptions and
adaptation behaviour in household responses to changes in flood risk. For
example, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies linking flood
risk perceptions and household-level risk reduction for the Eastern Baltic
countries. Therefore, in line with the increasing focus on behaviour in
flood risk modelling and management (see, e.g., Aerts et al. (2018)), a
wider evidence base on these variables must be developed. The reason is
that there is limited knowledge on how subjective perceptions or adap-
tation behaviours occur across Europe, which must be improved by future
research (Aerts et al., 2018). This is especially relevant with respect to the
limited temporal dimensions of the available datasets as most studies on
risk perception and adaptation behaviour use cross-sectional data collected
at one point in time. Nevertheless, even with additional data collection,
there will be inherent limitations to validating household-level risk-re-
duction behaviour and insurance-purchasing patterns at the European
scale due to the counterfactual nature of several of the modelled market
structures. For example, France has employed a compulsory insurance
system since the 1980s (Poussin et al., 2013), which means there is no
empirical information about voluntary flood insurance purchases there.
The current DIFI framework addresses these uncertainties by using three
different risk perception scenarios based on available data. This is done in
a similar way to how climate modelling often focusses on the ensemble
mean values of a range of models. Moreover, the model focusses mainly on
determining and comparing overall patterns in the results between in-
surance market structures rather than focussing on the absolute value es-
timates.
Another uncertainty arises from the weights associated with each of
the evaluation criteria in our MCA. Currently, we apply general patterns
of these weights across the European Union, although they can differ at
the country level because of varying local flood risk management ob-
jectives. For example, within a specific country, the penetration rate
and affordability criteria could be weighted at 0.5 each, whilst the re-
maining two criteria could be weighted at zero. A weighting scheme
like this would find the solidarity market optimal, whilst reversing this
particular weighting results in the semi-voluntary (PPP) and PPP mar-
kets becoming optimal. Therefore, stakeholder consultation within each
country is required to adapt the findings of the DIFI model to their
individual context. The current DIFI framework seeks to mitigate this
limitation by focussing on overall patterns found across a range of
synthetic risk management objectives and how these may be applicable
to specific countries.
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5. Conclusions
The combined effects of socioeconomic development and climate
change are expected to increase flood risk in many areas across the
world. This growing risk profile has resulted in an increased interest in
strategies that can help manage and limit the impacts of flooding. The
development of suitable flood insurance mechanisms is one such
strategy. Various countries have debated which kind of flood insurance
arrangement is best able to cope with future changes in flood risk. To
provide insights for this debate, we presented an initial comparative
evaluation of stylised flood insurance market structures for Europe
through the DIFI model framework, which is a holistic evaluation
method of flood insurance arrangements using four important criteria.
The results of the comparative DIFI model suggest a common in-
surance market reform pathway for insurance as a flood risk manage-
ment tool with the following features: limited premium cross-sub-
sidisation between high- and low-risk households, involvement of a
governmental reinsurer, incentives for policyholders to floodproof
homes, and stronger purchase requirements. Even though there is no
one-size-fits-all solution, there are common features which can guide
local discussions on reforms for flood insurance markets. These
common features, such as the movement towards a greater focus on
PPPs, involving a range of stakeholders, can lead to the creation of
mechanisms that support households to buy insurance and support the
insurance industry to provide a wider degree of coverage.
Moreover, due to the focus on stylised market characteristics, our
recommendations are applicable outside of Europe. Even though the
overall patterns of stylised flood insurance market characteristics ap-
pear to be generalisable, their practical implementation will have to be
tailormade according to local risk profiles and public policy preferences
(Raadgever et al., 2018).
Several areas of future research were identified based on the de-
velopment and application of the DIFI model framework. The primary
focus of risk reduction has been on the role of premium discounts for
households, whilst it is also possible to influence the risk behaviour of
governments and businesses through insurance. There are initial steps
in this direction (see, e.g., Unterberger et al. (2019)), and future re-
search in this area should be further developed. Additionally, re-
sidential flood insurance only protects against certain elements of
overall flood impacts, although there are also large potential impacts
through the disruption of infrastructure, governmental services, and so
forth which can be addressed in future studies.
Furthermore, future research can examine the most cost-effective
ways of reducing the transaction costs involved in stimulating policy-
holder risk-reduction behaviour through risk-based premiums, e.g.,
using certification of floodproof building practises. Moreover, me-
chanisms other than premium discounts may be effective in promoting
risk reduction, which can be evaluated in future studies. An example is
that insurers may raise policyholders’ risk awareness by better in-
forming them about the flood risk they face. In relation to this point,
improving knowledge about individual flood risk perceptions across
Europe and how these may be influenced by risk communication
campaigns could strengthen the empirical basis of this component in
the DIFI model.
A common finding of the DIFI model is that PPPs stand to play a
large role in future flood insurance reforms. The above research sug-
gestions can build upon this finding by extending the range of partners
involved to create a suitable enabling environment to strengthen the
link between insurance and risk reduction (see, for example, discussions
presented in Flood Re (2018), Surminski and Thieken (2017), or The
Geneva Association (2018)).
Finally, the focus of this paper was on fluvial flooding, but in the
light of climate change and increasing urbanisation, coastal and pluvial
flood risks stand to grow in importance. Thus, future research can focus
on understanding how these particular flood risks can be integrated into
a modelling framework like DIFI. This distinction is important because
coastal flooding and adaptation follow a different process to fluvial
flooding, whilst pluvial flooding processes follow localised phenomena.
In general, we believe that future research on multi-hazard risk as-
sessments can offer a useful basis for insurance modelling and adap-
tation studies.
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